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“Fair Shares”: Beyond capitalism and socialism, or the biological basis of social justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Peter A. Corning*
Affiliation:
Institute for the Study of Complex Systems, 119 Bryant Street, Suite 212, Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA PACorning@Complexsystems.org

Abstract

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The accumulating scientific evidence — across many disciplines — regarding human evolution and the dualities and complexities of human nature indicates that the core ideological assumptions of both capitalism and socialism are simplistic and ultimately irreconcilable. A biologically grounded approach to social justice enables us to articulate a new ideological paradigm that I call “Fair Shares.” This paradigm consists of three complementary normative principles. First, goods and services should be distributed to each according to his or her basic needs. Second, surpluses beyond the provisioning of our basic needs should be distributed according to merit. And, third, each of us is obliged in return to contribute to the “collective survival enterprise” in accordance with his or her ability. Though none of these three principles is new, in combination they provide a biologically informed middle way between capitalism and socialism. Some of the many issues that are raised by this formulation are also briefly addressed.

Type
Guest Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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