The Royal Society of London held a scientific meeting in September 2000 focusing on two theories of the origin of AIDS: one, that it occurred through “natural transfer” of immunodeficiency virus from monkeys or chimpanzees to humans; and the other, that it occurred through iatrogenic transfer via contaminated polio vaccines used in Africa in the late 1950s. This meeting was the culmination of years of public contention over the polio-vaccine theory. Several dimensions of the politics of science are revealed by analysis of this issue, including the power of scientific editors, the use of the mass media, decisions regarding selection of speakers and organization of the meeting, and epistemological assumptions made by participants.

Arguably, no curve in the world increases indefinitely—certainly no growth curve of human society. The quest for sustainable use of the planet involves estimating levels of activity, particularly resource use, that can continue indefinitely. Since the biosphere is dynamic, this continuation is not a stagnant, steady-state situation but rather a mutualistic interactive relationship between human society and the planet's ecological life support system. Human technology, creativity, and ingenuity may modify natural laws, but cannot be used to repeal them. Attempts to maintain the recent exponential growth of the human population, affluence, and artifacts cannot continue forever, or probably even for another century. At best, quality of life will be diminished, and, at worst, a substantial loss of human life will occur if both ethical and ecological issues are not freely and openly discussed. Sustainability may be visionary and unattainable, but it does offer an opportunity to improve the quality of life for future generations of humans and the other life forms, an opportunity that is far greater than possible with present unsustainable practices.

This article argues that an evolutionary psychological perspective could be useful for developing second-generation models of rationality. The standard model of complete rationality is inadequate primarily on the grounds that it generates predictions inconsistent with empirical data. The model is extremely useful and should not, nor cannot, realistically be dismissed. It accurately predicts outcomes in markets and openly competitive situations. However, behavioral phenomena that the standard theory has trouble explaining—such as mass contribution to public goods, types of cooperation, and altruism—are usually treated as “anomalies.” These outcomes are too prevalent and important to be treated as such. I attempt to build upon Elinor Ostrom's proposal to generate new models of rationality, which recognize the use of heuristics, norms, and rules, and are able to better account for empirical findings. I argue that second-generation models would benefit from the acknowledgment of social roles—but more specifically, evolved social roles. Evolved social roles are intuitive bundles of norms, expectations, and social strategies that shape an individual's player type. If we extend rationality to incorporate underlying bio-psychological mechanisms, such as evolved social strategies and evolved social roles, then we gain an understanding of a wider array of decision-making processes and social phenomena.

At the November 1998 general election, Michigan citizens were given the opportunity to vote on Proposal B, an initiative that would have legalized physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS initiatives also have been held in Washington State, California, Oregon, and Maine, with only Oregon's passing. We use exit poll data to analyze the vote on Proposal B. Attributes associated with social liberalism—Democratic Party identification, less frequent church attendance, more education, and greater household income—led to increased odds of a “yes” vote. Attributes associated with social conservatism—Republican Party identification and frequent church attendance—led to decreased odds of a “yes” vote. Similar to the abortion issue, PAS's supporters strongly value personal autonomy, whereas its opponents strongly value the sanctity of life. Voter alignments like those in Michigan will likely appear in other states with the initiative process if PAS reaches their ballots.

If the prescriptive “ought” is separated from the factual “is,” an intellectual analysis of the real world is by definition without normative value. The naturalistic fallacy thesis—maintaining that normative and descriptive spheres must remain separated—is often presented in a weak sense that seems reasonable. However, only in a strong sense—by strictly separating facts and values—are fallacy accusations supported. We claim that this naturalistic fallacy thesis is unsound and that normative statements instead should be based on rational understanding as found in the Darwinian and social sciences. The Cartesian compromise should be abandoned, since only naturalism can provide a cogent framework for better understanding and support ethics with a solid foundation. Many people nurture values based on tradition, whim, subgroup identification etc., and they demand respect for those values. However, we can demand respect for values only when they have a rational foundation. The common belief in the thesis of naturalistic fallacy is an anti-intellectual device that shields values from rational inquiry.

This article explores long-term issues and problems that have seriously undermined the U.S. Chemical Testing Program established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act. This program is meant to gather information needed to protect human health and the environment from damaging exposure to toxic chemicals. Despite seemingly broad and impressive authority under the statute, there are a number of inherent difficulties, as well as substantial political constraints, that impede comprehensive oversight of chemicals in U.S. commerce. The article discusses several approaches that EPA has adopted to overcome statutory and political limitations and increase chemical testing information. The most recent and promising of these efforts has involved international negotiations to harmonize testing approaches with OECD nations and to cooperate on an agenda that will better share the testing burden on an international level.

In the past quarter century, the concept of culture has undergone change as evolutionary scientists have come to include social behavior in their purview. Evolutionary psychology is the newest field to concern itself with culture by claiming that most specific human behaviors are generated by minds specifically designed for these behaviors—and not from a general-purpose mind—as a result of adaptations made during the Pleistocene. Thus, mental behaviors are explained as having formed independently of cultural learning. In defending the concept, however, the leading proponents practically slough off culture as significant in human affairs. I argue that they have neglected the powerful explanatory statement of Darwin regarding at least one general-purpose adaptation of social animals, namely, the instinct for sociability, a position supported by recent neurological studies. Expanding the Darwinian concept, modern research shows that (1) the human brain was selected for sociability, which explains the origin and strength of culture, as well as its variability; (2) the development of complex culture in a pre-human primate initiated the two-and-one-half million-year evolution to modern humans; and (3) there are political contributions to cultural evolution that rest on the nature of groups (competitive and cooperative).

The present discussion of sociobiological approaches to ethnic nepotism takes Pierre van den Berghe's theory as a starting point. Two points, which have not been addressed in former analyses, are considered to be of particular importance. It is argued that the behavioral mechanism of ethnic nepotism—as understood by van den Berghe—cannot explain ethnic boundaries and attitudes. In addition, I show that van den Berghe's central premise concerning ethnic nepotism is in contradiction to Hamilton's formula, the essential principle of kin selection theory. It is further discussed how other approaches that make reference to ethnic nepotism are related to van den Berghe's account and its problems. I conclude with remarks on the evolutionary explanation of ethnic phenomena.

Standard of living is determined in part by the availability of ecological resources, and in part by the availability of “cheap energy.” The demise of cheap energy is likely to occur during the twenty-first century. Gradually, over this time, humans will be restricted to using renewable natural capital. Reliance on renewable energy sources will require a reduction in population to within the range of 1.5 to 3 billion people in order to maintain what most of us would regard as an adequate lifestyle. Attention is drawn to the need for nations to exercise sovereign responsibility.

So that the reader can better adjudge possible disagreements, we would like to begin by stating, at the very outset, the thesis argued in our book, Darwinism, Dominance, and Democracy (Somit and Peterson, 1997). As Peter Corning correctly reports in his commentary (2000), we contend that “the most important reason for the rarity of democracy is that evolution has endowed our species, as it has other primates, with a predisposition for hierarchically structured social and political systems” (1997: 1). In short, we argue that Homo sapiens has a “genetic bias” toward authoritarian political societies characterized by hierarchy, dominance, and submission.

The response by Somit and Peterson to my earlier commentary in this journal (Corning, 2000), which sharply criticized their little-noticed 1997 book (by their own admission), must seem like old news that should be relegated to the obituary pages. On the contrary, it concerns one of the central political issues of our time—what sustains modern democracy, and what are its future prospects. Somit and Peterson in their modest book offered both a diagnosis and a prescription. I concluded in my essay that the result was disappointing—more for what was omitted than for any commissions. My critique involved a rather subtle argument, and, judging by the authors' response (Somit and Peterson, 2001), it seems to have been lost on them as well.