When, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an argument? What is the proper criterion of premise acceptability? Providing a comprehensive theory of premise acceptability, this book answers these questions from an epistemological approach that the author calls "common sense foundationalism". His work will be of interest to specialists in informal logic, critical thinking and argumentation theory as well as to a broader range of philosophers and those teaching rhetoric.
Contents
Part I. Acceptability: Dialectical and Epistemological Considerations: 1. Why do we need a theory of acceptability?; 2. Acceptability and presumption; 3. Factors determining presumption: basic considerations; 4. Epistemological considerations: acceptability, deontology, internalism, justification; Part II. Statements, Belief-Generating Mechanisms, and Presumptive Reliability: 5. What types of statements are there?; 6. Necessary statements and a priori intuition; 7. Descriptions and their belief-generating mechanisms; 8. Interpretations and their modes of intuition; 9. Evaluations and the moral faculties; 10. Taking one's word: the interpersonal belief-generating mechanism; Part III. Practice and Perspective: 11. An outline of the practice of epistemic causistry; 12. Theoretical considerations: a common sense foundationalism.

