This book studies the important issue of the possibility of conceptual change--a possibility traditionally denied by logicians--from the perspective of philosophy of mathematics. The author also looks at aspects of language, and his conclusions have implications for a theory of concepts, truth and thought. The book will appeal to readers in the philosophy of mathematics, logic, and the philosophy of mind and language.
Contents
Preface; Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1. Historical background; 2. Frege's opposition; 3. The grammar of constraints; 4. Expansions as rational procedures; 5. Implications for concepts; 6. From words to objects; 7. Gödel's argument; 8. Implications for thoughts; 9. 'I was led astray by language'; Epilogue: How do we go on from here?; References; Index.
Review
"Ambitious and Innovative" Review of Metaphysics
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