Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-fv566 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-22T08:25:26.722Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Acceptability and Presumption

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

James B. Freeman
Affiliation:
Hunter College, City University of New York
Get access

Summary

At the end of the chapter, we framed the following proposal:

A statement is acceptable just when there is a presumption in its favor.

This proposal practically follows analytically from Cohen's characterization of a presumption as what we may take for granted absent reasons against doing so (1992, p. 4). But it holds out much further promise for clarifying just what acceptability means and how we may determine when statements are acceptable. The concept of presumption is used in various disciplines. Aspects of its various uses and various ways of determining presumption may guide us in constructing a concept of epistemic presumption suitable for explicating acceptability. To develop this proposal, we first look at just how the concept of presumption is treated in various contexts.

USES OF “PRESUMPTION”

“Presumption” is first of all a jurisprudential notion. A courtroom proceeding is typically a debate between two opposing sides before an adjudicative panel. Presumption and its cognate notion “burden of proof” are ways of determining which adversary must argue what before this tribunal. If there is a presumption in favor of the innocence of the accused, then the burden is on the prosecution to argue for the guilt of that person. At least initially, the defense need not argue for innocence. The adjudicative panel is enjoined to accept that claim (i.e., to “take it for granted”) until and unless the prosecution successfully establishes guilt.

Type
Chapter
Information
Acceptable Premises
An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem
, pp. 21 - 37
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×