Book contents
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Part I Agenda
- Part II The Main Argument
- Part III Implications
- Part IV Empirical Tests
- 11 Bargaining Costs
- 12 Adaptation Frequency and the Boundary of the Firm
- 13 Asset Ownership and Externalities
- Part V Foundations
- Part VI Postscript
- Index
- References
13 - Asset Ownership and Externalities
from Part IV - Empirical Tests
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2016
Book contents
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Part I Agenda
- Part II The Main Argument
- Part III Implications
- Part IV Empirical Tests
- 11 Bargaining Costs
- 12 Adaptation Frequency and the Boundary of the Firm
- 13 Asset Ownership and Externalities
- Part V Foundations
- Part VI Postscript
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the FirmFoundations of the Resource-Based View, pp. 229 - 250Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016
References
Baker, George P., and Hubbard, Thomas, “Make vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” American Economic Review, 93, no. 3, 551–72, 2003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chamberlain, G., “Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data,” Review of Economic Studies, 47, 225–38, 1980.Google Scholar
Grossman, Sanford, and Hart, Oliver D., “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership,” Journal of Political Economy, 97, no. 4, 691–719, August, 1986.Google Scholar
Hart, Oliver D., Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.Google Scholar
Hart, Oliver D., and Moore, John, “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, no. 6, 1119–58, December, 1990.Google Scholar
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Milgrom, Paul, “The Firm as an Incentive System,” American Economic Review, 84, no. 4, 972–91, September, 1990.Google Scholar
Wernerfelt, Birger, “On the Nature and Scope of the Firm: An Adjustment-Cost Theory,” Journal of Business, 70, no. 4, 489–514, October, 1997.Google Scholar
Wernerfelt, Birger, “Why Should the Boss Own the Assets?” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 11, no. 3, 473–85, 2002.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver E., “Transaction-cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,” Journal of Law and Economics, 22, no. 4, 223–61, October, 1979.Google Scholar