Book contents
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Part I Agenda
- Part II The Main Argument
- Part III Implications
- Part IV Empirical Tests
- 11 Bargaining Costs
- 12 Adaptation Frequency and the Boundary of the Firm
- 13 Asset Ownership and Externalities
- Part V Foundations
- Part VI Postscript
- Index
- References
11 - Bargaining Costs
Existence and Sub-Additivity
from Part IV - Empirical Tests
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2016
Book contents
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Part I Agenda
- Part II The Main Argument
- Part III Implications
- Part IV Empirical Tests
- 11 Bargaining Costs
- 12 Adaptation Frequency and the Boundary of the Firm
- 13 Asset Ownership and Externalities
- Part V Foundations
- Part VI Postscript
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the FirmFoundations of the Resource-Based View, pp. 181 - 200Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016
References
Abreu, Dilip, and Gul, Faruk, “Bargaining and Reputation,” Econometrica, 68, no. 1, January, 85–117, 2000.Google Scholar
Abreu, Dilip, and Pearce, David, “Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts,” Econometrica, 75, no. 3, May, 653–710, 2007.Google Scholar
Bradley, Peter, “Juggling Services: It is just Another Buying Day,” Purchasing, Available from the second author on request.Google Scholar
Broadcast Music Inc. vs. Columbia Broadcast System. 441 U.S. Report, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978.Google Scholar
Busse, Meghan, Silva-Risso, Jorge, and Zettelmeyer, Florian, “$1000 Cash Back: The Pass-Through of Auto Manufacturer Promotions,” American Economic Review, 96, no. 4, September, 1253–70, 2006.Google Scholar
Camerer, Colin F., Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.Google Scholar
Coase, Ronald H., “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica New Series, 4, no. 16, 386–405, 1937.Google Scholar
Dewatripont, Mathias, and Tirole, Jean, “Modes of Communication,” Journal of Political Economy, 113, no. 6, December, 1217–38, 2005.Google Scholar
Galin, Amira, Gross, Miron, and Gosalker, Gavriel, “E-Negotiation versus Face-to-Face Negotiation What has Changed – If Anything?” Computers in Human Behavior, 23, 787–97, 2007.Google Scholar
Hart, Oliver D., and Moore, John, “Contracts as Reference Points,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, no. 1, February, 1–48, 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hayek, Friedrich. A., “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review, 35, no. 4, 519–30, 1945.Google Scholar
Hurwicz, Leonid, “Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes,” in Arrow, Kenneth J., Karlin, Samuel, and Suppes, Patrick (eds.) Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959.Google Scholar
Joinson, Adam N., “Self-Esteem, Interpersonal Risk, and Preference for E-Mail to Face-To-Face Communication,” Cyber Psychology and Behaviour, 7, no. 4, 472–78, 2004.Google Scholar
Levy, Daniel, Bergen, Mark, Dutta, Shantanu, and Venable, Robert, “The Magnitude of Menu Costs: Direct Evidence from Large U.S. Supermarket Chains,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, August, 791–825, 1997.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mankiw, Gregory, “Small Menu Costs and Large Business Cycles: A Macroeconomic Model of Monopoly,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, May, 529–39, 1985.Google Scholar
Ochs, Jack, and Roth, Alvin E., “An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining,” American Economic Review, 79, no. 3, June, 355–84, 1989.Google Scholar
Rubinstein, Ariel, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica, 50, no. 1, January, 97–109, 1982.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, Sidney, and Fouraker, Lawrence E., Bargaining and Group Decision Making, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960.Google Scholar
Simester, Duncan I., and Knez, Marc, “Direct and Indirect Bargaining Costs and the Scope of the Firm,” Journal of Business, 75, April, 283–304, 2002.Google Scholar
Smith, Lones, and Stacchetti, Ennio, “Aspirational Bargaining,” Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Michigan, 2003.Google Scholar
Watson, Joel, “Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information,” Review of Economic Studies, 65, July, 573–94, 1998.Google Scholar
Wernerfelt, Birger, “On the Nature and Scope of the Firm: An Adjustment-Cost Theory,” Journal of Business, 70, October, 489–514, 1997.Google Scholar
Wernerfelt, Birger, “Bargaining Before or After Communication,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 164, no. 2, June, 211–29, 2008.Google Scholar
Wernerfelt, Birger, “The Comparative Advantages of Firms, Markets, and Contracts: A Unified Theory,” Economica, 82, no. 329, 350–657, 2015.Google Scholar
Yildiz, Muhamet, “Waiting to Persuade,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, no. 1, 223–49, 2004.Google Scholar
Zbaracki, Mark, Ritson, Mark, Levy, Daniel, Dutta, Shantanu, and Bergen, Mark “Managerial and Customer Costs of Price Adjustment: Direct Evidence from Industrial Markets,” Review of Economics and Statistics; 86, May, 514–33, 2004.Google Scholar