Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 The Baltic in Autumn 1807
- 2 Sir James Saumarez Early Career
- 3 Saumarez takes up his Baltic Command
- 4 The Crisis of Rogervik
- 5 The Conversion to Peacemaker
- 6 The Pea Islands
- 7 Marshal Belle-Jambe Declares War
- 8 The Affair of the Carlshamn Cargoes
- 9 The Von Rosen Letters
- 10 Diplomatic Intrigues Napoleons Fateful Decision
- 11 The Final Year
- 12 Conclusions: the Man or the Situation
- Epilogue
- Appendix 1 Glossary of Place Names
- Appendix 2 Brief notes on some Lesser-known Names
- Bibliographical note
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - Diplomatic Intrigues Napoleons Fateful Decision
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 The Baltic in Autumn 1807
- 2 Sir James Saumarez Early Career
- 3 Saumarez takes up his Baltic Command
- 4 The Crisis of Rogervik
- 5 The Conversion to Peacemaker
- 6 The Pea Islands
- 7 Marshal Belle-Jambe Declares War
- 8 The Affair of the Carlshamn Cargoes
- 9 The Von Rosen Letters
- 10 Diplomatic Intrigues Napoleons Fateful Decision
- 11 The Final Year
- 12 Conclusions: the Man or the Situation
- Epilogue
- Appendix 1 Glossary of Place Names
- Appendix 2 Brief notes on some Lesser-known Names
- Bibliographical note
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In the winter of 1811/12 relations with France were at breaking point. Princess Desiree had returned to France, which might have improved relations since she was so unpopular, but it represented a further breaking of Bernadotte's bonds with his native country. Coquelle, however, maintains that her influence on Bernadotte was favourable to Napoleon and that he ‘was still entirely behind his former master’. These views appear to be too much based on the reports of Alquier who had evidently misread the situation, unlike Saumarez. A more recent biographer, Christian Bazin, also maintains that until 1812, Bernadotte ‘was cautiously pro-French’ and that ‘in Paris Charles Jean was seen as a French viceroy’. On the other hand, Vandal, writing in the 1890s, believed that ‘he showed himself more occupied with building up a cheap popularity than with establishing his influence in the royal counsels’ – that he missed the opportunity to give Sweden strong leadership, lacking because of the near senility of Charles XIII, and left decisions to a duumvirate of Engestrom and Adlercreutz, who themselves lacked any authority. It is a measure of how successfully Bernadotte had dissimulated, if we are to believe the evidence of the von Rosen letters.
In theory, the French position was strong. Despite the rumblings of discontent and future warfare, Russia was still her ally and was placed within easy range of Stockholm from her newly conquered Grand Duchy of Finland. The British fleet with its deep draught ships of the line would be unable to prevent an invasion launched by the extensive Russian skärgård fleet of gunboats through the intricate archipelago of the Aland Islands that closed off the southern end of the Gulf of Bothnia. Denmark remained firmly true to her alliance with France despite British destruction of her trade and disruption of the physical links with Norway, which was suffering from starvation as a result. She had so far proved hesitant to allow French troops access to Zealand in any number, but was in no position to resist possible French insistence on using her as a springboard for an invasion of Scania, the former Danish province of southern Sweden. And Swedish Pomerania was wholly at the mercy of the surrounding French troops, as was confirmed when Marshal Davout met no resistance when he invaded in January 1812.
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- Admiral Saumarez Versus Napoleon - The Baltic, 1807-12 , pp. 155 - 176Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2008