To deny premise 1 of the argument by counterexample is to claim that S doesn’t know P (that it’s a zebra, for example). This response, generalized, is tantamount to skepticism. I first consider and reject a compromise position – “downgrading” – according to which, although S doesn't know that P is true, she does know that it is probably true. I then draw a distinction between “wholesale” hypotheses (e.g., “I’m a brain in a vat”) directed against any empirical knowledge claim, and “piecemeal” hypotheses (e.g., “it’s a disguised mule”) directed against specific such claims, noting that the skeptic is better served by mobilizing the latter. The rest of the chapter concerns the skeptical closure argument. The skeptic must argue for her premise that we don’t know anti-skeptical Q. It turns out, however, that any such argument either renders the closure argument superfluous or undermines closure itself. I then consider an alternative skeptical strategy appealing to the claim that S’s warrant for P presupposes a prior warrant for Q. I call this “front-loading”. I point out that front-loading is far less plausible than is closure, so much so that the resulting argument is question-begging. I also come the same conclusion with respect to the skeptical underdetermination argument.