In this chapter I argue that epistemologists have no cause to be dismayed by transmission failure in Dretske cases. Some might worry that transmission failure robs us of the classical Moorean response to skepticism. I show that this response is either superfluous for or incapable of protecting ordinary knowledge from skeptical attack. I then argue that transmission fails on three popular conditions of warrant. The first is safety: although S’s belief in Q must be safe in order for her belief in P to be safe, her inference cannot contribute to the safety of her belief in Q. The second is reliabilism: I argue that any belief-forming process that violates NIFN must be understood to be ipso facto unreliable if reliabilism is to be at all tenable. As a result, closure fails in Dretske cases, which implies that transmission also fails. The third is evidentialism: since ~Q implies that S retains her evidence, it follows that that evidence undermines, rather than supports, Q. I argue for this from both a Bayesian standpoint and from a broader, intuitive standpoint.