Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Preface
- Contributors
- I Computing in Games
- II Algorithmic Mechanism Design
- 9 Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)
- 10 Mechanism Design without Money
- 11 Combinatorial Auctions
- 12 Computationally Efficient Approximation Mechanisms
- 13 Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design
- 14 Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design
- 15 Cost Sharing
- 16 Online Mechanisms
- III Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria
- IV Additional Topics
- Index
15 - Cost Sharing
from II - Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Preface
- Contributors
- I Computing in Games
- II Algorithmic Mechanism Design
- 9 Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)
- 10 Mechanism Design without Money
- 11 Combinatorial Auctions
- 12 Computationally Efficient Approximation Mechanisms
- 13 Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design
- 14 Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design
- 15 Cost Sharing
- 16 Online Mechanisms
- III Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria
- IV Additional Topics
- Index
Summary
Abstract
The objective of cooperative game theory is to study ways to enforce and sustain cooperation among agents willing to cooperate. A central question in this field is how the benefits (or costs) of a joint effort can be divided among participants, taking into account individual and group incentives, as well as various fairness properties.
In this chapter, we define basic concepts and review some of the classical results in the cooperative game theory literature. Our focus is on games that are based on combinatorial optimization problems such as facility location. We define the notion of cost sharing, and explore various incentive and fairness properties cost-sharing methods are often expected to satisfy. We show how cost-sharing methods satisfying a certain property termed cross-monotonicity can be used to design mechanisms that are robust against collusion, and study the algorithmic question of designing cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes for combinatorial optimization games. Interestingly, this problem is closely related to linear-programming-based techniques developed in the field of approximation algorithms. We explore this connection, and explain a general method for designing cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes, as well as a technique for proving impossibility bounds on such schemes. We will also discuss an axiomatic approach to characterize two widely applicable solution concepts: the Shapley value for cooperative games, and the Nash bargaining solution for a more restricted framework for surplus sharing.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Algorithmic Game Theory , pp. 385 - 410Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007
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