In general, leaders in rome and Moscow could each outdo the other in their opportunism, but they were not entirely cynical in expressing their concerns about Japanese inroads into Ethiopia. Their fears were real, even if exaggerated.

Haniyu Chotaro & Jacob Adol Mar, early 1934

ITALIAN EVALUATION

The year 1934 proved crucial for developing relations between Addis Ababa and Tokyo, and Rome evaluated their impact on Italian policy. One Italian report complained that Japan was dominating the cotton markets in East Africa, including Ethiopia. Further, Tokyo and Addis Ababa were already engaging in ‘important’ negotiations of unknown content, but they probably would not complete them until Japan had established a legation. Since the previous September, Japanese businessmen had been looking for facilities around the country for storing and selling Japanese goods. They were also seeking gold mining concessions in Wellega, a pottery and porcelain factory in Jimma, cement- and mat-making factories, and concessions for plantations to grow cotton and medicinal plants, including opium poppies. All this would require Japanese immigration into Ethiopia. As the Ethiopians wanted to weaken the influence of the tripartite powers – Britain, France, and Italy – in their country, Japanese action in Ethiopia thus transcended mere commercial activity and had assumed political importance. How could Italy stop Japan's penetration of Ethiopia? Rome could take diplomatic action in Tokyo, but for restraint the Japanese would demand a quid pro quo from Italy in Manchuria and primacy in China.