Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-gq7q9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-22T14:32:07.076Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Having, Gaining, Losing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Frederic Schick
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
Get access

Summary

ECONOMISTS have sometimes noted that we don't always value situations just by what we would have in them. They note that our thinking often instead looks to our gains or losses, to how what we might come to have differs from what we currently have. This, they hold, speaks badly for us, since the usual sorts of such thinking run against the logic of value. I argue that they don't run against it, and that giving such thinking its due lets us clear up a number of issues.

Here is a much-discussed concept, that of endowment effects. Richard Thaler, who introduced the idea, speaks of “the underweighting of opportunity costs” relative to out-of-pocket expenses. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler speak of “the increased value of a good to an individual when the good becomes part of the individual's endowment.” Tversky and Kahneman note that “the loss of utility associated with giving up a valued good is greater than the utility gain associated with receiving it.”

I will put it this way, that where we have something we value, losing it often matters more to us than gaining it would have mattered if we didn't have it.We insist on getting more for giving up that something than we would have paid for it if we didn't have it. Thaler offers this example: “Mr. R bought a case of good wine in the late 50s for about $5 a bottle. A few years later his wine merchant offered to buy the wine back for $100 a bottle.”

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Having, Gaining, Losing
  • Frederic Schick, Rutgers University, New Jersey
  • Book: Ambiguity and Logic
  • Online publication: 10 November 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610219.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Having, Gaining, Losing
  • Frederic Schick, Rutgers University, New Jersey
  • Book: Ambiguity and Logic
  • Online publication: 10 November 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610219.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Having, Gaining, Losing
  • Frederic Schick, Rutgers University, New Jersey
  • Book: Ambiguity and Logic
  • Online publication: 10 November 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610219.004
Available formats
×