Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-6d856f89d9-5pczc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T03:30:08.178Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

19 - Hamilton and His Army, Part Two, 1798–1799

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2013

John Lamberton Harper
Affiliation:
Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University, Italy
Get access

Summary

Taking Back the Helm

The last thing one expects to find in Adams’s writings is a word of praise for an action of the British government. The number of such instances scattered throughout his vast oeuvre are so rare that they can probably be counted on the fingers of a single hand. One of them was on New Year’s Day, 1799. Looking back at 1798, Adams wrote his wife: “The English have exhibited an amazing example of skill and intrepidity, perseverance and firmness at sea.”

Napoleon’s destination (as Rufus King was finally able to report in September and early October), was Egypt, where he had landed with his army on July 1 and thence probably India. Adam’s first stroke of luck came courtesy of the British navy and the “Nelson touch.” On August 1, 1798, in a rash, brilliant nighttime attack, Nelson’s squadron destroyed most of the French Mediterranean fleet at anchor in Aboukir Bay, leaving Napoleon marooned in the Levant. A second coalition against France, including Britain, Turkey, Russia, and in March 1799, Austria, began to form. In a lesser known action on October 11, 1798, the Royal Navy captured or dispersed a number of French men-of-war carrying troops and ammunition to assist the Irish rebellion against British rule. The French, it seemed, were mad enough to attempt almost anything. One of Napoleon’s biographers comments on the Egyptian campaign, “The whole enterprise was so preposterous that it remains an enigma.” But it was clear that they could not, for the time being, seriously threaten America. Though Adams was not prepared to admit it, the British navy was part of America’s first line of defense. His position in the fall of 1798 toward the European antagonists anticipated that of those Americans who believed that, after the British sinking of the battleship Bismarck, Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, and the containment of the German submarine menace in mid- to late 1941, the United States could safely adopt a stance of live and let live with the Reich.

Type
Chapter
Information
American Machiavelli
Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy
, pp. 224 - 236
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×