Civil-Military Relations, Political Aims and Operational Tensions in Northern Ireland, 1971–1972

In 1969, Defence Secretary Denis Healey looked back with satisfaction upon his part in reforming the military for a new, post-imperial era. Healey had cut defence spending by a third since 1964, making savings in the defence budget of £5 billion over five years. He had also brought the Army home; more than half of the UK's 59 infantry battalions now served in the UK, including ten in Northern Ireland on the newly constituted Operation Banner, the essential aim of which was to prevent sectarian rioting during a period of wider political reform in the province. Britain now had a military ‘fit for a different era’. But, within the senior ranks of the Army, a change in location did not mean a shift in values and tactics. In 1969, a police officer who worked closely with the Army, described the military ethos as he knew it:

This chapter contends that it took key senior officers a considerable time to adjust to the operational limitations of war at home in the UK. In Northern Ireland, ‘the offensive spirit’ had to be contained. The enemy was not to be shot on sight, unless he or she was imminently preparing an attack; he or she was to be arrested and tried by civilian courts. Discord between military and civilian leaders and dissent within battalions over the right type of tactics to pursue led to an inconsistent approach by the Army in Northern Ireland.