Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface to the first edition
- Preface to the second edition
- List of texts and abbreviations
- Introduction
- PART I AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S ATTACK ON PHILOSOPHY
- PART II REASON V. REVELATION IN PRACTICAL REASONING
- 4 Are the ethics of religion objective or subjective?
- 5 Happiness, philosophy and society
- 6 How to read Islamic philosophy
- Further reading
- Glossary
- Index of passages
- General index
4 - Are the ethics of religion objective or subjective?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface to the first edition
- Preface to the second edition
- List of texts and abbreviations
- Introduction
- PART I AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S ATTACK ON PHILOSOPHY
- PART II REASON V. REVELATION IN PRACTICAL REASONING
- 4 Are the ethics of religion objective or subjective?
- 5 Happiness, philosophy and society
- 6 How to read Islamic philosophy
- Further reading
- Glossary
- Index of passages
- General index
Summary
It is difficult to overemphasize the significance of legal discussions in the origination of controversies concerning the nature of ethics in Islam. The traditional view of the divine law held that legal judgments must be based upon nothing but the law, and if necessary derived indirectly from that law by some approved technique such as analogy, often interpreted in rather a restricted sense. The more innovatory position of those who adhered to opinion (ra'y) argued That in cases where the law provides no obvious guidance one must use one's own rational judgments alone in arriving at conclusions to disputes in law and ethics. This basic conflict was played out in many different contexts, with the ‘rationalists’ insisting that we can know much of what is right and obligatory by independent reasoning, while the ‘traditionalists’ acknowledged only revelation as an appropriate source for such knowledge. A great deal of the Muslim establishment – Shāfi'ī, ibn Ħanbal, al-Ash'arī and a large number of other theologians and jurists – lined up firmly on the side of tradition, believing basically that any other position would deny God's power, for, if we could judge independently of God what is right and wrong, could we not from an independent point of view judge God's actions and assess his moral pronouncements to us? Could we not do away with trying To follow God's instructions since all we need to do is to follow the instructions of our reason?
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy , pp. 147 - 173Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001