Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface to the First Edition
- Preface to the Second Edition
- Acknowledgements
- Table of cases
- A note on documentation
- List of abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The rise of international organizations
- 3 The legal position of international organizations
- 4 The foundations for the powers of organizations
- 5 International organizations and the law of treaties
- 6 Issues of membership
- 7 Financing
- 8 Privileges and immunities
- 9 Institutional structures
- 10 Legal instruments
- 11 Decision making and judicial review
- 12 Dispute settlement
- 13 Treaty-making by international organizations
- 14 Issues of responsibility
- 15 Dissolution and succession
- 16 Concluding remarks: Towards re-appraisal and control
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Institutional structures
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface to the First Edition
- Preface to the Second Edition
- Acknowledgements
- Table of cases
- A note on documentation
- List of abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The rise of international organizations
- 3 The legal position of international organizations
- 4 The foundations for the powers of organizations
- 5 International organizations and the law of treaties
- 6 Issues of membership
- 7 Financing
- 8 Privileges and immunities
- 9 Institutional structures
- 10 Legal instruments
- 11 Decision making and judicial review
- 12 Dispute settlement
- 13 Treaty-making by international organizations
- 14 Issues of responsibility
- 15 Dissolution and succession
- 16 Concluding remarks: Towards re-appraisal and control
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Most international organizations possess a variety of organs, set up to perform various distinct functions and, perhaps, also to keep each other in check. Within the EC, the idea of the institutional balance as a principle behind the distribution of powers has gained some prominence, and has traditionally been honoured by the EC Court. And with respect to the UN, as Martti Koskenniemi has noted, something similar may be seen:
The Security Council should establish/maintain order: for this purpose, its composition and procedures are justifiable. The Assembly should deal with the acceptability of that order: its composition and powers are understandable from this perspective. Both bodies provide a check on each other. The Council's functional effectiveness is a guarantee against the Assembly's inability to agree creating chaos; the Assembly's competence to discuss the benefits of any policy – including the policy of the Council – provides, in principle, a public check on the Great Powers' capacity to turn the organization into an instrument of imperialism.
In much the same way as state organs constitute the machinery of states, performing tasks in the name of the state, so too do the organs of international organizations perform tasks in the name of the organization. Usually they lack a separate legal personality, which indicates that they are not to be considered as actors in their own right.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- An Introduction to International Institutional Law , pp. 153 - 177Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009