Abstract

This chapter is part of a wider research on Daoism in general, and the Daodejing (道德經, c. 300 BCE) in particular, which is, most broadly, attempting to establish a philosophy of comparison. The thesis of this chapter is that philosophy ought always to proceed through comparisons. This is both a theoretical hypothesis and a methodological praxis (πρᾶξις, ‘practice’). These two aspects need to be conceived as a singular and yet multifarious movement of thoughts. It is, in fact, only in virtue of this philosophical process of comparisons that one can determine the reference systems that are necessary for the evaluation of one’s own pre-assumptions. The scope, therefore, is not to find equivalences between concepts, as comparative studies traditionally do; instead, the intention is to posit, each and every time, a theoretical and methodological framework that allows for the interpretation of the comparisons. In other words, the purpose of such a philosophy is not to find equivalences or differences, but to see how equivalences and differences can stimulate each other towards other meanings. Thus the configurations of comparisons become maps of philosophical processes and vice versa, in a constant exchange of positions. Moreover, conceiving comparisons in such a fashion means to have ethical stances towards oneself, the world, and others. That is to say, one can practice care of the self only through dialogues, by comparing oneself with the world and others. This is what I try to demonstrate in this chapter. In particular, I consider the concept of dao (or tao, 道) and its formulation in the first line of the Daodejing. First, I analyse some of the most common—and misleading—translations of this line into English. Then I compare the concepts of way-making and be-wëgen in, respectively, Ames/Hall and Heidegger. Finally, I propose a different approach to understanding dao.

Keywords: Daodejing (道德經), philosophy of comparison, Heidegger, invenìre