END OF THE GUERRA OFENSIVA

Defeat in the Downs, combined with upheaval in the Iberian peninsula, significantly altered the military balance in the North Sea theatre. Amongst other things, it meant that Dunkirk, for so long master of prizes, became itself the single greatest prize of the war, epicentre of the struggle for European mastery.

Tromp's victory over Oquendo's armada restored to the United Provinces the maritime hegemony which – to put it weakly – had become so insecure since the 1620s, and with it the reputation of Dutch mariners. In the heritage of mythology which accompanies and sometimes obscures history, it was Tromp, epitome of Holland's ‘natural’ or inalienable pre-eminence upon the sea, who was remembered and not Oquendo, representative of the beaten force which made the Republic's efforts so necessary and so glorious. In analysing the verdict of war, we must (of course) recognise the crucial Dutch achievement in concentrating over 100 warships in the Channel, and in destroying or capturing the greater proportion of the Spanish fleet. But remarkable also was the quasi-indomitable challenge of the latter, a challenge as important as the quasi-desperate need of the Dutch to overthrow it. The causes, as well as the consequences, of events are part of historical understanding; and Spain was a great, some might still say, a Universal, cause.

The creation of the Almirantazgo del Septentrión had been, in large enough part, a worthwhile experiment.