For many years we have been hearing that autonomy is important. Immanual Kant held that autonomy is the foundation of human dignity and the source of all morality; and contemporary philosophers dissatisfied with utilitarianism are developing a variety of new theories that, they often say, are inspired by Kant. Autonomy has been heralded as an essential aim of education; and feminist philosophers have championed women's rights under the name of autonomy. Oppressive political regimes are opposed on the grounds that they deny individual autonomy; and respect for the autonomy of patients is a recurrent theme in the rapidly expanding literature on medical ethics. Autonomy is a byword for those who oppose conventional and authoritative ethics; and for some existentialists, recognition of individual autonomy is apparently a reason for denying that there are objective moral standards. Both new rights theorists and the modern social contract theorists maintain that their theories best affirm autonomy. Finally, and not least in their esteem for autonomy, well known psychologists speak of autonomy as the highest stage of moral development.

Recently, however, the importance of autonomy has been questioned from a variety of sources. Utilitarian critics have struck back at the neo-Kantians, and a group of moral philosophers, sometimes labeled “personalists,” have challenged the Kantian ideal that we should be moved by regard for impartial principles rather than concern for particular individuals. A “different voice” is being heard, emphasizing aspects of morality too often ignored in the persistent praise of autonomy.