Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Basic elements of a model and definitions of stability
- 3 System stability and the balance of power
- 4 Resource stability and the balance of power
- 5 Preventive war
- 6 Geography, balancers, and central powers
- 7 Great-power alliance formation, 1871–1914
- 8 European conflict resolution, 1875–1914
- 9 Summary and conclusions
- References and selected bibliography on European great-power relations, 1871–1914
- Index
8 - European conflict resolution, 1875–1914
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Basic elements of a model and definitions of stability
- 3 System stability and the balance of power
- 4 Resource stability and the balance of power
- 5 Preventive war
- 6 Geography, balancers, and central powers
- 7 Great-power alliance formation, 1871–1914
- 8 European conflict resolution, 1875–1914
- 9 Summary and conclusions
- References and selected bibliography on European great-power relations, 1871–1914
- Index
Summary
Should equilibrium be attained at one point, it would immediately be wiped out by the search for slight superiority.
Ernest B. Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?“ (1953, p. 450)[A] system of flexible alliance arrangements can only maintain stability if the core powers can jointly increase their capabilities at the expense of peripheral actors.
Partha Chatterjee, Arms, Alliances, and Stability (1975, p. 126)In Chapter 7, we examined the general applicability of our model to alliance formation, concluding that European alliances between 1871 and 1914 are consistent with a calculation of coalitional value derived from the concept of system stability, and consistent as well with the respective roles of Germany and Britain as central power and balancer. However, system stability does not imply resource stability, which leaves room at a more microlevel for threats and counterthreats to be directed at achieving, if not the “slight superiority” to which Haas refers, at least some advantage. This view of instability within stability leads us to different predictions about conflict resolution than others offer. Translating his assertion into our terms, Chatterjee sees resource instability yielding system stability only if the game is not constant-sum - if members of the system can expropriate from external entities. We argue, though, that alliance flexibility allows wholly endogenous adjustments, but only if those adjustments are consistent with the requirements of such stability. We must check, then, whether we can interpret actual resource adjustments as being constrained if not dictated by system stability, and subsidiarily to see what insights we can gain about alliance formation and maintenance.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Balance of PowerStability in International Systems, pp. 271 - 310Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1989