THE Arab Revolt which began in June 1916 moved forward and spread only slowly. The Arabs who became fighters were generally untrained, unless they were former Ottoman soldiers. The family of the Sharif Husain was more interested in establishing itself in power – certainly a necessary first step – than in liberating fellow Arabs, and it did not altogether trust the British. In this they had good reason, as the Balfour Declaration had shown, and as the revelation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by the Bolsheviks in 1917 confirmed. The prospect of this particular family rising to prominence and power in Arabia and in Syria disquieted other Arabs, notably their neighbours in Arabia who were their enemies. But the central element in all this was the need for anyone who aspired to power in Syria and Iraq and Palestine – the Fertile Crescent – to be victorious in war. This applied as much to the British and French as it did to the Sharifian Arabs. Unless and until the Allies could demonstrate that they were winning and were likely to be victorious, most Arabs would not support them.

The capture of Aqaba in July 1917 provided the Arab forces in the north with a seaport through which to communicate with, and receive military supplies from, Egypt. This was much more convenient than the ports which had been used earlier along the middle Arabian coast. The town was defended successfully soon after its capture, and so it became a base from which the Hejaz railway could be raided.