During the 47-year period from 1755 to 1802, Britain was at war for just over half of this time. Unlike the previous period of peace-time from 1749 to 1754, or the ones before it, this time the Marines maintained their establishment. Yet, like the other services in peace-time, their manpower numbers were significantly reduced. The Admiralty and the Marines needed an operational justification in order to continue the Marine Corps's existence throughout the various peace-time economy drives of the period. This led to a rebranding of the Marines as a vital tool in the state's (and Navy's) ability to project its power in broader foreign and imperial policy forays. A definition of the terms of foreign and imperial policy in the eighteenth century is necessary, as these can, on occasion, be ambiguous. For the purpose of this chapter, the term ‘foreign’ is focused on any actions the British took against continental powers like France, Spain and Russia. Alternatively, the term ‘imperial’ is defined in the broader sense of a ‘Greater Britain’, encompassing India and the various American colonies. Throughout this time the Navy was considered to be the primary tool of both foreign and imperial policy in peace-time. Conversely, the Army was largely preoccupied with land-based imperial policing actions in Ireland or the Colonies. The Army was hence largely used as a static garrison force to maintain the imperial possession of territory in peace-time.