Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Charts and Tables
- Foreword by Dr Roger Knight
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Notes and Conventions
- Introduction
- 1 British Expeditionary Warfare, 1793–1815
- 2 Bringing Forward Merchant Shipping for Government Service, 1793–1815
- 3 Competing Demands for Merchant Shipping, 1793–1815
- 4 Economy versus Efficiency
- 5 Conjunct Operations and Amphibious Assaults: Naval and Military Co-operation
- 6 Troop Ships: King's Ships or Merchant Transports?
- 7 Castlereagh's European Expeditions, 1805–08
- 8 1809: A Year of Military Disappointments
- 9 The Turning of the Tide
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - British Expeditionary Warfare, 1793–1815
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Charts and Tables
- Foreword by Dr Roger Knight
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Notes and Conventions
- Introduction
- 1 British Expeditionary Warfare, 1793–1815
- 2 Bringing Forward Merchant Shipping for Government Service, 1793–1815
- 3 Competing Demands for Merchant Shipping, 1793–1815
- 4 Economy versus Efficiency
- 5 Conjunct Operations and Amphibious Assaults: Naval and Military Co-operation
- 6 Troop Ships: King's Ships or Merchant Transports?
- 7 Castlereagh's European Expeditions, 1805–08
- 8 1809: A Year of Military Disappointments
- 9 The Turning of the Tide
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Campaigns were ultimately decided not only by fighting qualities but also by the effectiveness of pre-planning, the efficiency of supply and logistics, and the extent of support from indigenous population and allies.
The Principal Theatres of War, 1793–1815
Between 1793 and 1795 the British Cabinet launched attacks on two fronts. In northern Europe it attempted to establish footholds on the European mainland and in the West Indies it resolved to destroy France's financial stability by attacking the islands which provided the source of its wealth. The European expeditions launched in 1793, to Flanders, Dunkirk, Brittany and Holland, failed, as did subsequent expeditions to the Vendée in 1795, Ostend in 1798, den Helder in 1799 and Ferrol in 1800. Following these setbacks Henry Dundas, Secretary of State for War (1794–1801) admitted that he was ‘impressed with a deep conviction that we cannot take a direct part in the military operations on the Continent, we can only act indirectly and collaterally with our Continental allies’. After Ferrol there were no more attempts to land forces in northern Europe until 1805 when a force was despatched to Hanover in northern Germany; but this campaign was abandoned and the troops withdrew without engaging the enemy. However, in 1807, there were two successful campaigns against Heligoland and Copenhagen. An expedition in 1808 to the Baltic to support the Swedes was less so: it returned to England within two months. This was followed, in 1809, by the Scheldt (also known as Walcheren) expedition, which was to be the most monumental failure of the wars. This disaster was followed by partial success in Holland in 1813–14 and finally Anglo-Prussian success at Waterloo in June 1815.
Despite operational successes, the early expeditions to the West Indies were contentious: the excessive death rate, which accounted for 50 per cent of the army, was attributable to yellow fever, rather than conflict fatalities. More recently, the significance of the economic legacy of these expeditions has been exposed, rebalancing the negative perceptions.
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- Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2016