Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- PART ONE WHICHCOTE AND CUDWORTH
- PART TWO SHAFTESBURY
- PART THREE HUTCHESON
- 10 Early Influences on Francis Hutcheson
- 11 Hutcheson's Attack on Egoism
- 12 Hutcheson's Attack on Moral Rationalism
- 13 A Copernican Positive Answer and an Attenuated Moral Realism
- 14 Explaining Away Vice, or Hutcheson's Defense of a Copernican, Theistic Positive Answer
- PART FOUR DAVID HUME
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
11 - Hutcheson's Attack on Egoism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- PART ONE WHICHCOTE AND CUDWORTH
- PART TWO SHAFTESBURY
- PART THREE HUTCHESON
- 10 Early Influences on Francis Hutcheson
- 11 Hutcheson's Attack on Egoism
- 12 Hutcheson's Attack on Moral Rationalism
- 13 A Copernican Positive Answer and an Attenuated Moral Realism
- 14 Explaining Away Vice, or Hutcheson's Defense of a Copernican, Theistic Positive Answer
- PART FOUR DAVID HUME
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter, I explain Hutcheson's attack on egoism, or the view that humans are always ultimately motivated by self-interest. In Section A, I discuss why Hutcheson thought it so important to defeat egoism. In B, I describe the central aspects of Hutcheson's anti-egoist position. And in C, I examine one particular anti-egoist argument and its relationship to the anti-rationalist arguments for which Hutcheson would eventually become most well known.
The Negative Answer of Bernard Mandeville
Almost all of us at least sometimes distinguish between those who are virtuous and those who are not. Almost all of us think that certain things people do are moral and that other things people do are not moral. This is a plainly observable feature of human life.
According to Hutcheson, when we distinguish between virtuous and non-virtuous people, we do so on the basis of motive (Beauty and Virtue 162–8, 191, 197, 229, 266–7). Specifically, we judge people to be virtuous when we believe they are motivated by benevolence (or the desire to benefit others), and we judge people to be non-virtuous when we believe they are motivated by desires that are not benevolent. As Hutcheson puts it, “If we examine all the Actions which are counted amiable any where, and enquire into the Grounds upon which they are approv'd, we shall find, that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they always appear as Benevolent, or flowing from Love of others, and a Study of their Happiness, whether the Approver be one of the Persons belov'd, or profited, or not” (Beauty and Virtue 162; cf. Passions and Affections 37).
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- Information
- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006