Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech
- The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Part I Economics of Antitrust-IP
- Part II Institutional Design: Country Overviews
- Part III Monopolization
- Part IV Competitor Collaboration
- Part V Vertical Relations
- 19 Bundling and High Tech Industries
- 20 Tying Arrangements and Intellectual Property
- 21 Online RPM
- Part VI Mergers in High Technology
- Index
- References
21 - Online RPM
from Part V - Vertical Relations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 May 2017
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech
- The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Part I Economics of Antitrust-IP
- Part II Institutional Design: Country Overviews
- Part III Monopolization
- Part IV Competitor Collaboration
- Part V Vertical Relations
- 19 Bundling and High Tech Industries
- 20 Tying Arrangements and Intellectual Property
- 21 Online RPM
- Part VI Mergers in High Technology
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Chapter
- Information
- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
References
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