Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence
- The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Part I Intelligence and Its Measurement
- Part II Development of Intelligence
- Part III Intelligence and Group Differences
- Part IV Biology of Intelligence
- Part V Intelligence and Information Processing
- 20 Basic Processes of Intelligence
- 21 Working Memory and Intelligence
- 22 Intelligence and Reasoning
- 23 Problem-Solving and Intelligence
- 24 Intelligence and Decision-Making
- 25 Artificial Intelligence
- 26 Intelligence and Video Games
- Part VI Kinds of Intelligence
- Part VII Intelligence and Its Role in Society
- Part VIII Intelligence and Allied Constructs
- Part IX Folk Conceptions of Intelligence
- Part X Conclusion
- Author Index
- Subject Index
- References
24 - Intelligence and Decision-Making
from Part V - Intelligence and Information Processing
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 December 2019
Edited by
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence
- The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Part I Intelligence and Its Measurement
- Part II Development of Intelligence
- Part III Intelligence and Group Differences
- Part IV Biology of Intelligence
- Part V Intelligence and Information Processing
- 20 Basic Processes of Intelligence
- 21 Working Memory and Intelligence
- 22 Intelligence and Reasoning
- 23 Problem-Solving and Intelligence
- 24 Intelligence and Decision-Making
- 25 Artificial Intelligence
- 26 Intelligence and Video Games
- Part VI Kinds of Intelligence
- Part VII Intelligence and Its Role in Society
- Part VIII Intelligence and Allied Constructs
- Part IX Folk Conceptions of Intelligence
- Part X Conclusion
- Author Index
- Subject Index
- References
Summary
There are two ways to study how people make decisions. Decision-making under risk deals with well-defined situations where all possible outcomes and their probabilities are known for certain. Examples are playing roulette or buying a lottery ticket. Decision-making under uncertainty, by contrast, deals with ill-defined situations where this certainty is not attainable for humans or machines, such as how to invest your money, or whom to marry. Risk can be tamed by logic probability theory; uncertainty needs more smart heuristics. Many situations require both competencies. In this chapter, I introduce the tools for both forms of decision-making, the debates associated with the nature of rationality, and the link between decision-making and intelligence.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence , pp. 580 - 601Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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