As part of his wider discussion of the problem of the stability of the theory of justice as fairness, Rawls examines various aspects of the moral education of citizens. In considering this issue, he is concerned to show that a society that is effectively regulated by the two principles of justice is likely to persist over time. A necessary condition for such persistence is that the society continues to produce the right kind of support for its institutions in each new generation. Rawls argues that, given certain general features of human psychology, it is very likely that children who grow up surrounded by just institutions will develop a sense of justice – that is, a complex set of moral dispositions that favor compliance with the requirements of justice. Different social institutions will contribute at different times and in overlapping ways to the acquisition of a mature sense of justice, in both intentional and unintentional ways.

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls sketches a speculative account of moral learning and the underlying psychological processes that make it possible (TJ 397–419). This account of moral learning includes elements from a variety of psychological theories. But its main inspiration comes from the particular theories developed by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. These theories hold that moral development goes through a sequence of stages that require increasing cognitive development. Rawls agrees with this general framework. In his view early moral education takes place primarily in the context of the family. Assuming that the family is just, and that parents are loving and supportive, children will naturally come to love and trust their parents and develop a disposition to respect and obey their guidelines. Rawls calls this early stage of moral learning the morality of authority. It does not presuppose any understanding of the wider schemes within which parental precepts or norms are justiied.