Liberalism is commonly associated with the principle that democratic governments should remain neutral on the question of what the best kind of life is. Rawls’s theory of justice is commonly thought to be committed to this kind of neutrality in virtue of the veil of ignorance, which plays an important role in his argument from the original position. The veil of ignorance prevents parties in the original position from knowing their own conceptions of a good life, which means that the justification of Rawls’s principles of justice does not presuppose the truth of any such conception. In this sense his theory of justice is neutral toward different conceptions of a good life, and a government regulated by his conception of justice is therefore neutral in this sense too. How are parties in the original position supposed to choose between principles if they do not know their conceptions of a good life? Rawls supposes that parties in the original position have “higher-order interests” in developing and exercising their two moral powers fully, the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. He supposes that in virtue of these interests they will choose a liberal conception of justice that guarantees an equal right to the basic liberties, because the basic liberties are social conditions necessary for the full development and exercise of the two moral powers. But, he maintains, to suppose that parties in the original position have these higher-order interests in the development of their moral powers is not to assume the truth of any comprehensive moral, religious, or philosophical doctrine, thus preserving the neutrality of the argument from the original position.