Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations for Rawls’s texts
- Introduction
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- 174 Race
- 175 Rational choice theory
- 176 Rational intuitionism
- 177 Realistic utopia
- 178 The reasonable and the rational
- 179 Reasonable hope
- 180 Reasonable pluralism
- 181 Reciprocity
- 182 Reconciliation
- 183 Redress, principle of
- 184 Relective equilibrium
- 185 Religion
- 186 Respect for persons
- 187 Right: concept of, and formal constraints of
- 188 Rights, constitutional
- 189 Rights, moral and legal
- 190 Rorty, Richard
- 191 Ross, W. D.
- 192 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
- 193 Rule of law
- 194 Rules (two concepts of)
- S
- T
- U
- W
- Bibliography
- Index
191 - Ross, W. D.
from R
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations for Rawls’s texts
- Introduction
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- 174 Race
- 175 Rational choice theory
- 176 Rational intuitionism
- 177 Realistic utopia
- 178 The reasonable and the rational
- 179 Reasonable hope
- 180 Reasonable pluralism
- 181 Reciprocity
- 182 Reconciliation
- 183 Redress, principle of
- 184 Relective equilibrium
- 185 Religion
- 186 Respect for persons
- 187 Right: concept of, and formal constraints of
- 188 Rights, constitutional
- 189 Rights, moral and legal
- 190 Rorty, Richard
- 191 Ross, W. D.
- 192 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
- 193 Rule of law
- 194 Rules (two concepts of)
- S
- T
- U
- W
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Rawls took very seriously the views of W. D. Ross (1877–1971), as representing two of the main traditions in moral and political philosophy that he sought to unsettle.
Pluralistic intuitionism is the normative view that there is a plurality of basic and conflicting values or principles that have to be weighed against one another on the basis of intuition to determine how we ought to act – Ross, for example, proposes seven prima facie duties that pick out features of acts that count for or against them but he also claims that there are no further principles, only bare intuitions, to help us decide what our duty is all things considered. Rawls regarded this view as the default position in moral and political theory because it captures core features of commonsense moral reasoning without oversimplifying the moral facts, so we ought to admit “the possibility that there is no way to get beyond a plurality of principles” (TJ 36). Yet he thinks that pluralistic intuitionism is “but half a conception” because “assignment of weights is an essential and not a minor part” of a moral and political theory (TJ 37).
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- Information
- The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon , pp. 739 - 740Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014