Although they had failed to carry Garibaldi with them at Naples, the radicals clung for a few more hours to the hope that they might keep their foothold in Sicily. But by 13 October, though Crispi did not yet realize it, his foolish omission to keep Palermo informed had forced Mordini into surrender. Crispi should no 4tmbt have visualized earlier that there was the possibility of serious trouble arising from the slowness in communications with Sicily. Briefly recapitulated, the situation at Palermo was that Mordini's project for an assembly had seemed widely acceptable, at least until the 11th. Then on the 12th there had spread rumours of Pallavicino's decision for a plebiscite; and especially as this decision was mistakenly believed to be Garibaldi's, it had successfully captured public opinion. Mordini's despairing account of this fact was contained in perhaps the only telegram during this period to reach Naples in less than twelve hours, and what it said may well have had an influence on Garibaldi's mind. Its effect on Crispi had been to make him suddenly aware that his preoccupation with Naples might be losing him Sicily too; and so he had bent all his efforts to what then seemed the best compromise still attainable, that Sicily as well as Naples should each have both plebiscite and assembly. This device now offered the only chance of keeping radical supremacy in the south, at least for a little longer, and so of forcing Cavour to sacrifice some of his more extreme claims before the revolution was concluded.