Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables, Figures, and Maps
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 General Overview
- PART ONE BASIC STRUCTURE
- PART TWO THE RELATIONAL DYNAMIC
- 5 From the Beginnings to Vietnamese Independence
- 6 Unequal Empires
- 7 The Brotherhood of Oppression: 1840–1950
- 8 Lips and Teeth: 1950–1975
- 9 Illusions of Victory: 1975–1991
- 10 From Normalization to Normalcy
- 11 Change and Structure in Asymmetry
- Appendix: Glossary of Terms
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Illusions of Victory: 1975–1991
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables, Figures, and Maps
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 General Overview
- PART ONE BASIC STRUCTURE
- PART TWO THE RELATIONAL DYNAMIC
- 5 From the Beginnings to Vietnamese Independence
- 6 Unequal Empires
- 7 The Brotherhood of Oppression: 1840–1950
- 8 Lips and Teeth: 1950–1975
- 9 Illusions of Victory: 1975–1991
- 10 From Normalization to Normalcy
- 11 Change and Structure in Asymmetry
- Appendix: Glossary of Terms
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
American attention toward Vietnam faded rapidly after the withdrawal of American combat troops in early 1973, and therefore Americans generally do not have a sufficient appreciation for the significance of Vietnam's victory in 1975 and the subsequent reunification of the country. A deeper reason might be that no country likes to dwell on situations that demonstrate the limits of its power. Although America became obsessed with its own traumatic experience of defeat in Vietnam, it was far less interested in the implications of Vietnam's victory. Indeed, in America the word Vietnam referred to the American war there, not to the country. Vietnam itself had slid out of the frame of American attention already in 1973, and tortured replays of the war experience in such movies as The Deer Hunter (1978) and Rambo (1982) took its place and its name.
For the rest of the world, Vietnam's victory was a remarkable accomplishment. From a global perspective, it demonstrated the limits of American power and was a vindication of the critical distance from American engagement that most of the world had maintained. Indeed, until the end of the Cold War and the success of the Persian Gulf War, anxieties persisted even within the United States concerning America's global leadership.
The Soviet Union was quite aware that it did not control Vietnam, but on the chessboard of bipolar politics Vietnam was the most significant “win” since Cuba, and Soviet aid and support over the previous ten years had been crucial.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- China and VietnamThe Politics of Asymmetry, pp. 186 - 211Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006