Having discussed China–United States frictions over Taiwan, Part III of this book now examines the development of relations between mainland China and Taiwan particularly between 1995 and 1998. Developments in cross-strait relations since late 1998 to 1999 and future prospects will be discussed in Part IV.

This chapter looks at the evolution of both China's perception of Taiwan and Taiwan's position on reunification before the 1995–96 Strait Crisis to help explain how China and Taiwan got onto a collision course and why China has come down so hard on Taiwan.

China's Perception of Taiwan

The sharp response by Beijing to Lee's United States visit reflected a fundamental change of its perception of the position of Taiwan leaders on reunification, and consequently a major change in its Taiwan policy.

When Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo were in power in Taiwan from 1949 to 1987, Beijing never suspected them of seeking Taiwan's independence. Mao knew his old rival too well to be disturbed by the thought of Chiang Kai-shek seeking Taiwan's independence. He considered Chiang's resistance as only an unwillingness “to confess to being defeated” or a “matter of face”, not an intention to seek Taiwan's independence. On the contrary, the two Chiangs suppressed those who advocated independence no less harshly than they did communists in Taiwan. Very often they strenuously resisted what they suspected to be a U.S. effort to split Taiwan from China permanently. As a matter of fact, in private many Chinese officials and scholars highly respect the two Chiangs as national heroes as far as reunification and maintaining China's territorial integrity are concerned. They regard them as having strong patriotism. As for their close alliance with the United States against Beijing, this is seen as a strategy for survival and common ground in an ideological commitment against communism, but never against reunification.

It is now widely reported that in the 1950s and 1960s, Chiang Kai-shek tried to maintain secret channels with Beijing for negotiation and that he sent his own men to Beijing several times for secret discussions with leaders about reunification.