Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- 5 Churchill and the Middle East
- 6 Eden and the Middle East
- 7 Halifax and the Middle East
- 8 The military and the Middle East
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
8 - The military and the Middle East
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- 5 Churchill and the Middle East
- 6 Eden and the Middle East
- 7 Halifax and the Middle East
- 8 The military and the Middle East
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
London
For the chiefs of staff in London, the first priority was the security of the home theatre, the next that of the Middle East. Although, from the outset, the deficiencies of the Middle East were considered dangerous, it was nonetheless accepted throughout the summer that few reinforcements could be spared until the threat of invasion at home decreased. Pound, chief of naval staff did not see, in May, how, despite the deficiencies in the Mediterranean, reinforcements could be spared – troops, aircraft, submarines. Subsequently specific reinforcements became possible and by mid-October the admiralty was ‘extremely anxious to reinforce the Mediterranean’ on the lines proposed by Churchill and hoped for a programme of reinforcements after the end of the year. Dill, chief of the imperial general staff, though supportive of Wavell and his needs, was initially uncertain that anything could be done and did not see that the British army would be ‘ready to carry out any offensive operation for a long time to come on a large scale’. By October he was anxious to reinforce the Middle East, particularly in the air. Newall, chief of air staff before Portal, opposed the despatch of reinforcements at the expense of the home defence, though by late September he was prepared to concede certain limited parcels. By mid-October his plans (approved by the chiefs of staff) for reinforcing the Middle East involved the equipping, bringing up to strength and expansion of first line strength of existing squadrons in the Middle East, rather than sending new units.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940–1941 , pp. 153 - 164Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994