Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- Preface
- Glossary and abbreviations
- Maps
- Introduction
- 1 The triumphal march of reaction
- 2 The establishment of the Kolchak Government
- 3 ‘What Kolchak Wants!’: military versus polity in White Siberia
- 4 Inside Kolchakia: from ‘a land of milk and honey’ to ‘the dictatorship of the whip’
- 5 White débâcle
- 6 White agony
- Conclusion
- Appendix The Anti-Bolshevik Governments in Siberia, 1918–1920
- Bibliography
- Index
Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- Preface
- Glossary and abbreviations
- Maps
- Introduction
- 1 The triumphal march of reaction
- 2 The establishment of the Kolchak Government
- 3 ‘What Kolchak Wants!’: military versus polity in White Siberia
- 4 Inside Kolchakia: from ‘a land of milk and honey’ to ‘the dictatorship of the whip’
- 5 White débâcle
- 6 White agony
- Conclusion
- Appendix The Anti-Bolshevik Governments in Siberia, 1918–1920
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
‘History will probably lay the blame for the military failure on Kolchak’, asserted General Knox in a final report to the War Office upon his return to Britain from Siberia at the end of 1919. He was not wrong. In 1933, for example, the American clergyman and scholar, George Stewart, chose to conclude his pioneering study of the White armies precisely with the claim that ‘the chief cause of failure was Kolchak himself’. If it has demonstrated anything at all, however, our study of the circumstances of the admiral's personal, political and military demise has surely demonstrated that Stewart's summation was altogether too severe and too glib in its exclusive personalization of the White failure in Siberia. In an addendum to his afore-mentioned report, which raises a number of important supplementary points, Knox explained why:
The entire responsibility for the failure in Siberia must not be attributed to Admiral Kolchak. There were, it is true, traits in his character which ill-fitted him to be Supreme Ruler at such a time. Although he was obstinate, he was deficient in real strength of character and fell easily under the influence of any individual who happened to be continually in his company. He was much too soft hearted and allowed the military machine to be seriously affected by the constant jealousies and bickerings of his subordinates, rather than compel honest, patriotic work by stern measures. He wasted time in attempting to direct military operations, of which he knew nothing, and neglected the civil administration in the rear. […]
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- Civil War in SiberiaThe Anti-Bolshevik Government of Admiral Kolchak, 1918–1920, pp. 668 - 678Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1997