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4 - Agreements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2009

Oliver Black
Affiliation:
King's College London
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Summary

Overview

Article 81(1) EC prohibits agreements with an anticompetitive object or effect, but does not define ‘agreement’: the meaning of the word has been left to emerge from the case-law. The advantage of this approach is that it allows a term's meaning to develop to fit the cases' contours: that development could be hampered by an explicit definition which every decision or judgment had to be made to fit. One disadvantage is that definition through cases is a haphazard process which is swayed by the specific facts that come before the authorities: the features of those facts tend to gain undue prominence in the jurisprudence. Another is that, as the diversity of the cases increases, the term's meaning can come to lack conceptual unity: the term is applied to a congeries of situations that have little significant in common. ‘Agreement’ in EC antitrust arguably displays both these faults, particularly the second: the textbooks standardly say that the word has a wide meaning and go on to list the diverse states of affairs that have been brought under it. It is salutary, therefore, to step back from the cases' details and to reflect, at a more abstract level, on what an agreement is.

The first part of this chapter proposes two models of an agreement which develop the idea that an agreement exists where one party, X, gives a conditional undertaking and the other, Y, responds with an unconditional undertaking.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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  • Agreements
  • Oliver Black, King's College London
  • Book: Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust
  • Online publication: 08 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494666.006
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  • Agreements
  • Oliver Black, King's College London
  • Book: Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust
  • Online publication: 08 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494666.006
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Agreements
  • Oliver Black, King's College London
  • Book: Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust
  • Online publication: 08 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494666.006
Available formats
×