In July 1974 Karamanlis was pitchforked into a crisis which was to test his political skills to the full. The mindless chauvinism of the military had provoked the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war, and precipitated an unprecedented collapse in civil authority. Yet the resources at the prime minister’s disposal were minimal in the face of a military power structure which for more than seven years had been without effective restraint or challenge. It still contained significant elements that were disinclined to make way for politicians for whom they had professed nothing but contempt. But the manifest bankruptcy of the junta and its demonstrable unpopularity, together with the huge upsurge in support for Karamanlis, coupled with his own steady hand, were to ensure a remarkably smooth transition from military rule to a pluralist democracy. For the next seven years, the political system functioned more effectively than at any time previously. That Karamanlis was balancing on a delicate tightrope was demonstrated by the fact that for several weeks following his return he slept on board a yacht, watched over by a destroyer.

Karamanlis’ overriding priority was to defuse the risk of war with Turkey, never a realistic option given the imbalance between the two countries’ armed forces and the shambles of the mobilisation ordered by Brigadier Ioannidis in the twilight hours of the military dictatorship. In mid-August the Turkish army, following the breakdown of peace talks in Geneva, fanned out from its initial beachhead in northern Cyprus. It established a zone of occupation, delimited by the Attila line extending from Morphou in the west to Famagusta in the east, that covered nearly 40 per cent of the island. Despite this, Karamanlis made it clear that he rejected a military solution to the crisis. He could, moreover, expect little support from notional allies. The United States was convulsed by President Nixon’s resignation under the threat of impeachment and Dr Henry Kissinger, the secretary of state, who had been inclined to dismiss President Makarios as the ‘Castro’ of the eastern Mediterranean, was slow to react to the crisis. Britain, whose colonial policies had created the Cyprus problem and who, with Greece and Turkey, was a guarantor of the 1960 constitutional settlement, effectively washed her hands of the imbroglio.