Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-vsgnj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-20T18:22:58.928Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Section 6 - Some judgments that have been erroneously attributed to the mind, or the solution of a metaphysical problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Hans Aarsleff
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
Get access

Summary

§I I believe that so far I have not attributed to the soul any operation that everyone is not able to perceive in himself. But to account for visual phenomena, philosophers have believed that we form certain judgments of which we are not conscious. This opinion is so generally accepted that Locke, the most cautious of them all, adopted it. Here is how he explains it:

On the subject of perception, it is relevant to observe that the ideas we receive by sensation are often altered in grown people by the judgment of the mind, without our taking any notice of it. Thus when we set before our eyes a round body of uniform color, of gold, alabaster, or jet for example, it is certain that the idea that is imprinted in our mind at the sight of this globe represents a flat circle, variously shadowed, with different degrees of light coming to our eyes. But having by use been accustomed to distinguish the sort of images that convex bodies are wont to produce in us and the alterations that occur in the reflection of light, by the sensible difference in the bodies, we right away, for what appears to us, substitute the very cause of the image we see by virtue of a judgment which custom has made habitual with us; so that joining to what we see a judgment that we confuse with it, we make our own idea of a convex figure and a uniform color, though the eyes actually represent to us only a flat surface variously shaded and colored, as it would appear in painting. […]

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2001

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×