Introduction

In the winter of 1784 Kant published two essays on politics, history and the future of mankind. These essays are Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (IUH 8:15–31) and An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (WE 8:35–42). They are the earliest works in which Kant sets out some of the distinctive implications of the critical philosophy for politics, history and the future of mankind. Yet apart from some short, occasional works, Kant then turned aside from these themes for the better part of a decade. He resumed intensive work on the trend of history and the future of mankind in his late works of the 1790s. Arguably he found it necessary to go further towards completing a critique of reason, and in particular of practical reason, before returning to what he had come to see as the practical questions of history and politics.

The two essays of 1784 have often been read as occasional pieces that rehearse widely accepted Enlightenment views. What Is Enlightenment? has been read as a tepid defence of press freedom, marred by an embarrassing partial endorsement of enlightened despotism. Idea for a Universal History has been read as a conventional eighteenth-century account of the social dynamics by which conflict can lead to human progress. As I read them, both essays develop distinctive themes and arguments that are deeply rooted in Kant's critical philosophy and both are in various ways remote from conventional Enlightenment thought.

As I read What Is Enlightenment? the essay seeks to articulate central requirements for a critical conception of reason. In it Kant distinguishes ‘public’ and ‘private’ uses of reason in a distinctive way that hinges not on the size or composition of the actual audiences addressed, but on characteristics of the reasons that are offered. In Kant's view, ‘private’ reasoning is restricted, in that it assumes but does not vindicate putative authorities, such as the edicts of state or church, or the claims of happenstantial desires or opinions. It can therefore offer reasons only to those who accept the presumed authority, and any conclusions it reaches are conditional on that acceptance. This account of ‘private’ reasoning explains why Kant classifies the communication of those acting in an official capacity as ‘private’: they offer reasons only to others who accept the presumed ‘authority’.