For the Nixon administration, the period from 1969 into the first half of July 1971 constituted the initial phase of transition toward a new conception of China and China policy. It was a contested process, with a number of different strands moving ahead at varying speeds within the bureaucracy, in the public discourse, and through secret channels. In contrast to the previous chapter on Nixon's China discourse and broad foreign policy strategy before and shortly after taking office, this chapter focuses on the official China policy discourse in the State Department, the intelligence agencies, and the Defense Department, as well as in the National Security Council and the White House, at a time when the new administration was debating, deliberating, and defining the shape of its China policy.

This analysis sheds particular light on the much-vaunted difference between the State Department's approach to China and the White House's strategy and preferred paths. The received notion – from the accounts of Kissinger and other NSC staff members – is that State Department officials were obsessed with issues of secondary importance, such as trade and Taiwan, and missed the larger geopolitical picture, while Kissinger and Nixon were very much alive to the opportunity offered by China's strategic need for better relations with the United States, given the threat of a Soviet attack. Contemporary documents reveal, however, that most officials did recognize the potential advantages of triangular politics after the outbreak of Sino-Soviet hostilities in March 1969.