THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS

At the beginning of the twentieth century there was a strong tradition of realism about universals that was closely associated with a correspondence approach to truth. This view was represented by major figures such as Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, according to many interpreters, such as Black and Fahrnkopf. It was also represented by less well-known figures, such as W. E. Johnson; John Wisdom, who endorsed Russell's 1910 theory of truth; and F. P. Ramsey, who endorsed the associated theory of judgement. Russell and Wittgenstein's work on logical atomism is to a large extent devoted to the correspondence theory of truth, despite the fact that neither used the term ‘correspondence theory of truth’ in the titles of any of their works. Russell, while being clear about the nature of the immanent realist view of universals, was apparently a Platonist about properties and relations in the early part of the twentieth century, though he was less clear about the nature of Platonism. And despite the fact that he made a point of rehabilitating relations, he echoed the scepticism about relations of Leibniz and Ockham by regarding them as things obviously not found in this world. But by 1940, at any rate, Russell had become an immanent realist.

This tradition of realism about universals persisted into mid-century in the work of Ayer, Austin, and Strawson, with Ayer echoing Russell, but with Austin and Strawson less happy about metaphysical investigation on account of their linguistic approach.