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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2018

Thomas Schwartz
Thomas Schwartz
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University of California, Los Angeles
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Cycles and Social Choice
The True and Unabridged Story of a Most Protean Paradox
 , pp. 151 - 157
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018

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  • References
  • Thomas Schwartz, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Book: Cycles and Social Choice
  • Online publication: 09 March 2018
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316848371.014
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  • References
  • Thomas Schwartz, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Book: Cycles and Social Choice
  • Online publication: 09 March 2018
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316848371.014
Available formats
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  • References
  • Thomas Schwartz, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Book: Cycles and Social Choice
  • Online publication: 09 March 2018
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316848371.014
Available formats
×