“Even if we go under as a result of this,” General Erich von Falkenhayn stated on 4 August 1914, “still it was beautiful.” These almost surrealistic words by the Prussian war minister in many ways encapsulate the mood that prevailed among Germany's political and military elite as July yielded to August 1914. Historians since then have hotly debated the why of the decision to go to war. Fritz Fischer suggested that it was part of a “grab for world power.” John C.G. Röhl has insisted that it was to establish German hegemony over the Continent. Andreas Hillgruber, on the other hand, argued that it was nothing more than an effort to secure the Reich's tenuous position as a European great power.

We wish to state up front that the available evidence supports Hillgruber. There was no talk of a “grab for world power” during the July Crisis. The Imperial High Sea Fleet was eight battleships and thirteen cruisers behind schedule in 1914. To put it differently, the British Royal Navy enjoyed a numerical advantage of nine battleships or battle cruisers, ten light cruisers, and seventy-three destroyers in the North Sea alone. Moreover, it was clear to senior leaders in Berlin that in any war involving Britain, the German colonies were indefensible and would be seized with impunity. Thus, it is not surprising that the discussions in Berlin in 1914 were dark and defensive, of breaking the entente's iron ring of “encirclement,” of striking “now or never,” of “securing” the gains of 1870–71, and of assuring the “survival” of the “last reliable ally” in Vienna.