By now, it should be clear that the history of declaring of war in the United States is a story of extreme ambiguity and confusion. In terms of the competence of who makes the declaration, of the quality of the texts written, and of the procedures by which the texts are produced, no consistency can be found. For example, even when the Congress meets the minimal constitutional procedures for declaring war, as in 1812, 1917, and 1941, the process is still entirely insufficient because the text lacks all substance. The 1812, 1917, and 1941 declarations are like passing a law saying, “that taxes be increased, and the same is hereby increased, and that the president be, and he is hereby, directed and empowered to use the entire Internal Revenue Service to increase taxes.” Such a law would meet the minimal constitutional criteria for law-making, but most people, not including the president of course, would observe that the text is not really adequate to its purposes. Something important is missing; a necessary specificity is missing. Ideally then, the rule of law requires not only a performative speech act by a competent speaker, attention to proper procedures, but a substantive text as well. Sadly, this chapter catalogues the results of more than two hundred years of inattention to these three elements of the rule of law.