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4 - Current Regulatory Issues

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

G. A. (Sandy) Mackenzie
Affiliation:
Public Policy Institute, AARP
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Summary

The Rationale for Regulation

The answer to the question “Why regulate employer-provided pensions?” may seem obvious. Nonetheless, a review of the rationale for regulating employer-provided pensions sheds light on why regulatory frameworks can differ from one country to another, and can also lead to a benchmark for evaluating certain features of a country's regulatory apparatus.

The most basic reason for regulating an employer-provided pension, especially a traditional pension, is that it is so complex a social and economic institution that laissez-faire, or self-regulation, will not be feasible. Too much can go wrong. A traditional pension plan channels a large share of the saving of working men and women into investments in order to pay a pension to the workers when they retire, which may represent a significant proportion of their income in retirement. The malfunctioning of a pension plan can jeopardize the welfare of many workers, and its complexity increases the chances of malfunction. Defined-contribution plans are less complex for the sponsor than defined-benefit plans, but they face their own risks. The possibility that defined-contribution plans will not perform as they should to provide a secure retirement is just as great as it is with traditional plans, perhaps even greater. A traditional pension plan's complexity derives from its long planning horizon and the sophisticated investment strategy that such a horizon demands, but also owes something to the rules the plan applies to determine eligibility for and the value of the benefits it pays.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Decline of the Traditional Pension
A Comparative Study of Threats to Retirement Security
, pp. 94 - 114
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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