Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Notes on contributors
- Preface
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits
- 2 Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid
- 3 US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy
- 4 Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems
- 5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality
- 6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union
- Part III Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability
- Part IV Directions for future research
- References
- Index
- Titles in this series
6 - Delegation and discretion in the European Union
from Part II - Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Notes on contributors
- Preface
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits
- 2 Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid
- 3 US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy
- 4 Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems
- 5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality
- 6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union
- Part III Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability
- Part IV Directions for future research
- References
- Index
- Titles in this series
Summary
The European Union (EU), like other international organizations (IOs), is composed of its member states. The governments of those member states have signed and ratified successive treaties outlining the objectives and institutions of the Union, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 and continuing through the creation and institutional elaboration of today's European Union. As in any international organization, the member governments of the EU have assigned to themselves the central role in the governance of the Union. At the same time, however, the EU's member governments have created and allocated increasing powers and discretion to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Parliament (EP), and a growing number of independent agencies which are delegated regulatory and/or informational functions in specific issue-areas. Although clearly the creation, or agents, of the member governments, these supranational organizations possess powers and preferences distinct from those of their member-state principals, and they have frequently been posited by both practitioners and academic observers as the embodiment of the project of European integration, and indeed as the “engines” or “motors” of the integration process.
The delegation of such powers to supranational organizations, the editors of this project point out, raises two fundamental and linked issues. First, why do states choose to delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to IOs, rather than merely acting unilaterally or cooperating directly?
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- Information
- Delegation and Agency in International Organizations , pp. 165 - 196Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006
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