Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface
- 1 LAWS, BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DELEGATION
- 2 RATIONAL DELEGATION OR HELPLESS ABDICATION? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS
- 3 STATUTES AS BLUEPRINTS FOR POLICYMAKING
- 4 A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, DISCRETION, AND THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS
- 5 LEGISLATION, AGENCY POLICYMAKING, AND MEDICAID IN MICHIGAN
- 6 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEMS
- 7 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
- 8 LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICYMAKING PROCESSES
- APPENDIX A MMC LAWS USED IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX B POLICY CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX C PROCEDURAL CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX D THE FORMAL MODEL OF DISCRETION
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
- Titles in the series
APPENDIX D - THE FORMAL MODEL OF DISCRETION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface
- 1 LAWS, BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DELEGATION
- 2 RATIONAL DELEGATION OR HELPLESS ABDICATION? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS
- 3 STATUTES AS BLUEPRINTS FOR POLICYMAKING
- 4 A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, DISCRETION, AND THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS
- 5 LEGISLATION, AGENCY POLICYMAKING, AND MEDICAID IN MICHIGAN
- 6 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEMS
- 7 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
- 8 LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICYMAKING PROCESSES
- APPENDIX A MMC LAWS USED IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX B POLICY CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX C PROCEDURAL CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX D THE FORMAL MODEL OF DISCRETION
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
In this appendix, we provide the details of the formal models that provide the foundation for the main theoretical arguments described in Chapter 4.
The Parliamentary Model
The parliamentary model assumes that a Politician, L (for Legislative actor – we introduce P, for President, later), can unilaterally adopt a bill, and a Bureaucratic agent, B, can implement it. The interaction between these two players involves arriving at an outcome on the real line. Without loss of generality, we assume that L's ideal point is xL = 0 and B's ideal point is xB∈ [0,1]. The ideal points are common knowledge, and each player's utility from the final policy outcome is a linear loss function.
In the first stage, the Politician either does nothing, which retains a status quo, Q ∈ ℝ, or adopts a new law, x∈ [0,Ī]. The policy x = Ī is the maximal discretion law, and to simplify the number of parameters in the model, we set Ī = xB + 1 (which, as will become clear, always allows the Bureaucrat to implement the policy that will yield his most preferred outcome). The law, x, defines the upper bound on policies that the Bureaucrat can implement that are in compliance with the statute. We've parameterized the model so that the Politician never has an incentive to set a lower bound that is less than 0. Thus, as x increases, the Bureaucrat's discretion increases.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Deliberate Discretion?The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy, pp. 242 - 258Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002