The fiscal policy of the Attlee government has often been seen as having significance well beyond the immediate conduct of economic policy. On the one hand, there has been much dispute about how far ‘Keynesianism’ was evident in that policy, and whether the late 1940s can be seen as crucial in the (alleged) Keynesian revolution in economic policy in Britain. On the other hand, the character of fiscal policy in this period has been seen as a key to Labour's approach to policy-making. In particular, the extent to which fiscal policy displaced controls and ‘planning’ in Labour's policy repertoire has often been seen as indicative of the strength or weakness of its socialist commitment.

On the first issue, particular attention has focused on the second budget of 1947. Cairncross called this budget ‘a turning point in postwar fiscal policy’, whilst Booth saw it as ‘a major milestone, when the Treasury finally turned in peacetime and out of choice to Keynesian analysis to help control inflation’. In contrast to this view, Rollings has brought out the distinction between the views of Treasury officials and the actual conduct of policy, and suggested that from either perspective the extent of Keynesianism in the 1947 budget can easily be exaggerated. Also critical of the view of 1947 as a key turning point is Howson who nevertheless acknowledges the extent of the Keynesian advice being pressed upon the Labour government from its earliest days.