This chapter contrasts the initiatives of the Thatcher government and Reagan administration in a core area of social policy: old-age pensions. As might be expected, attempting to cut these popular social programs was politically dangerous; each government experienced both severe setbacks and occasional success. In the end, however, the Thatcher government implemented far-reaching and probably irreversible reforms in pension provision. This outcome is especially striking because it defies the conventional wisdom that middle-class entitlements are inviolable. Furthermore, it stands in stark contrast to the repeated and politically costly failures of Thatcher's efforts to reform the other pinnacle of British social provision for the middle class, the National Health Service. In the United States, Social Security emerged from the Reagan years essentially intact. Although the Social Security amendments of 1983 produced some significant reductions in future pension benefits, a number of glaring setbacks overshadowed this single and limited political success. In contrast to Britain, reform in the United States modestly scaled back the existing pension program rather than refashioning policy in line with conservative preferences.

A satisfactory account of these events must explain both the marked divergence in final outcomes and the patterns of success and failure in each country. Why did some initiatives fail when others did not? Why did the ultimate form and scope of retrenchment differ substantially in the two cases? My answer to these questions stresses the crucial role of preexisting pension structures – the feedback effects of previous policy choices.