Until now we've done no more than establish the existence of an end in the universe. But how should this end be understood? The physicotheological argument views the world as a work of art and sees its finality as reflecting the intelligence of the artist who conceived of and produced the present order. But might this involve an unjustified anthropomorphism? Why assume the intervention of a being who realizes his designs outside himself? Why can't finality, things proceeding spontaneously toward their ends, be immanent? A good example of such finality is instinct, which pushes beings surely and unconsciously toward their ends. It might be the same with the universe. A doctrine of this kind is found in Aristotle's theory of desire, later taken up by Hegel. For Aristotle, efficient causes are merely appearances, for in reality all causes are final causes. The purely ideal end of things exists only at the moment of origin and then comes to realize itself. Things move toward their ends by attraction, not mechanical impulsion. This theory of immanent finality, which can also be found in the work of Hartmann and Schopenhauer, is designed to avoid the anthropomorphism of the theory of transcendent finality. But what's the great advantage of rejecting the assumption that God's intelligence is analogous to that of men? It's true that, by comparing this intelligence to instinct, we avoid the sin of anthropomorphism. But we simply substitute zoomorphism in its place. Yet this isn't the really important criticism of the theory.